Complaint August 26, 2024 (2024)

Case

2019-1 IH BORROWER LP WITH GP 2019-1 IH BORROWER G VS INGRID ESCOBAR ET AL

Aug 29, 2024 |ND 03 - North Dade 03 - Judge Stein, Linda S |Evictions - Residential |Evictions - Residential |2024-169388-CC-23

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ATLAS RESIDENTIAL, LLC VS LUIS VALERIANO

Aug 29, 2024 |HI 01 - Hialeah 01 - Judge Abreu, Milena |Evictions - Residential |Evictions - Residential |2024-169575-CC-21

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SM PARCEL A LLC VS YOCHANAN AUSTERLITZ

Aug 22, 2024 |ND 05 - North Dade 05 - Judge Ihekwaba, Chiaka |Evictions - Residential |Evictions - Residential |2024-166824-CC-23

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ADVENIR AT WALDEN LAKE LLC VS JOSEPH R GREEN ET AL

Aug 21, 2024 |ND 01 - North Dade 01 - Judge Lehr, Myriam |Evictions - Residential |Evictions - Residential |2024-166171-CC-23

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INTERCOASTAL YACHT CLUB LLC VS GEORGY FEDOROVICH BEREGECH

Aug 22, 2024 |ND 06 - North Dade 06 - Judge Harris, Ayana N |Evictions - Residential |Evictions - Residential |2024-166771-CC-23

Case

CENTERWAY CLUB APARTMENTS LLC VS MYRIAM STELLA BOLIVAR ACOSTA

Aug 27, 2024 |CC 06 - Downtown Miami 06 - Judge Perez-Medina, Luis |Evictions - Residential |Evictions - Residential |2024-167740-CC-05

Case

AR PATAGONIA CORP VS JULIEN JEANTY

Aug 28, 2024 |CC 01 - Downtown Miami 01 - Judge Barket, Michael G |Evictions - Residential |Evictions - Residential |2024-168251-CC-05

Case

HUARAO ZHOU VS JONATHAN STEVEN MAGEE

Aug 26, 2024 |SD 03 - South Dade 03 - Judge De La Rosa, Lissette |Evictions - Residential |Evictions - Residential |2024-167677-CC-26

Case

52 HOMESTEAD REALTY LLC VS RAIQUEL FERRIA ET AL

Aug 23, 2024 |SD 05 - South Dade 05 - Judge Gonzalez-Paulson, Michaelle |Evictions - Residential |Evictions - Residential |2024-166235-CC-26

Ruling

VANYSHA MARIE THOMPSON, ET AL. VS TONY HUY LIM, ET AL.

Sep 03, 2024 |24LBCV00396

Case Number: 24LBCV00396 Hearing Date: September 3, 2024 Dept: S25 Procedural Background On February 26, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants Tony Huy Lim, Margaret Chung and Does 1 to 20, alleging: 1. Breach of Contract 2. Breach of Warranty of Habitability 3. Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment 4. Wrongful Eviction 5. Violation of California Civil Code §1940.2 6. Violation of Long Beach Municipal Code § 8.101.030 7. Violation of California Civil Code § 1946.2 8. Negligence Plaintiffs allege that they were lawful tenants at a real property located at 6902 Eastondale Avenue, Long Beach, California (property) that they believe was owned, operated, managed and/or maintained by Defendants. (Compl., ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs also allege that the property leased to them by Defendants was an illegal, unpermitted unit. (Compl., ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs further allege that on February 23, 2022, the City of Long Beach Code Enforcement Bureau inspected the property and noted various violations of the Long Beach Municipal Code; also on or about March 10, 2023, Defendatns were issued a citation warning notice by City of Long Beach Development Service, Code Enforcement Bureau. (Compl., ¶¶ 15, 16.) Plaintiffs assert that during their tenancy at the property, they experienced substandard conditions at the property, including but not limited to damaged portions of the roof and eaves and mold in several areas of the property. (Compl., ¶ 17.) Plaintiffs state their tenancy was terminated so Defendants could do construction on the Property and that they moved from the property on or about July 28, 2023. (Compl., ¶¶ 19, 20.) On April 19, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiffs applications for appointment of Guardian Ad Litem for minors Zamarion Weldon Thompson and Zekhi Blessing Thompson. On July 8, 2024, Defendants filed the instant Demurrer as to the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th Causes of Action and a Motion to Strike Portions of the Complaint. As of August 28, 2024, no opposition has been filed. Legal Standards Demurrer A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing partys pleading. It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purpose of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true, however improbable they may be. A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no speaking demurrers). A demurrer is brought under Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10 [grounds], § 430.30 [as to any matter on its face or from which judicial notice may be taken], and § 430.50, subd. (a) [can be taken to the entire complaint or any cause of action within]. Specifically, a demurrer may be brought per Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e) if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. Per Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (a), a demurrer may be brought where the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. However, in construing the allegations, the court is to give effect to specific factual allegations that may modify or limit inconsistent general or conclusory allegations. (Financial Corporation of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3rd 764, 769.) And, if the facts pled in the complaint are inconsistent with facts which are incorporated by reference from exhibits attached to the complaint, the facts in the incorporated exhibits control. Further, irrespective of the name or label given to a cause of action by the plaintiff, a general demurrer must be overruled if the facts as plead in the body of the complaint state some valid claim for relief. Special demurrers are not allowed in limited jurisdiction courts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 92, subd. (c).) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.) Motion to Strike A party may move to strike matters from an opposing partys pleading if it is irrelevant, false or improper. (See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 435, 436, subd. (a).) Motion to strike may also target all or any part of pleadings not filed or drawn in conformity with the applicable laws, rules or orders. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) A Motion to Strike is the proper procedure for testing the adequacy of a punitive damages allegation because punitive damages are not a cause of action. (Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 164.) Meet and Confer The meet and confer requirements of Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a) and Code of Civ. Proc., § 435.5 have been satisfied. Tentative Ruling 1st Cause of Action Breach of Contract To prevail on a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove (1) the contract, (2) the plaintiff's performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff. (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) If [an] action is based on alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement must be attached and incorporated by reference. (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) Alternatively, the plaintiff may also plead the legal effect of the contract. (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.) The complaint does not state any details of the alleged lease agreement entered into, when Plaintiffs moved into the property and contractual provisions that Defendants allegedly breached. Plaintiffs have failed to attach the lease contract to their complaint. Plaintiffs only supporting allegation is that portions of the property were cited by the City of Long Beach on February 23, 2023, but even that does not identify the entire unit as being unpermitted or uninhabitable. (Compl., ¶ 15.) 2nd Cause of Action Breach of Warranty of Habitability [T]here is a warranty of habitability implied in residential leases in California. (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1296.) [A] tenant may bring suit against the landlord for damages resulting from such breach. (Id. at p. 1297.) The elements of such an affirmative claim are the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises' habitability, notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant's discovery of the condition, the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages. (Ibid.) [A] tenant may maintain a tort action against his landlord for damages suffered by way of annoyance or discomfort or for injury to his personal property caused by the landlord's failure to keep the premises in a habitable condition. (Id. at p. 1298.) Plaintiffs have not identified in what way there was a material defective condition affecting the propertys habitability. Plaintiffs have also not alleged when they notified Defendants of the material defective condition(s) and that reasonable time was given for Defendants to correct the deficiency. The claim fails to state sufficient facts for a breach of warranty of habitability cause of action. 4th Cause of Action Wrongful Eviction The law provides both statutory and tort remedies for wrongful eviction. (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1037.) Under the tort remedies, a person in peaceable possession of real property may recover, in an action sounding in tort, damages for injuries to his person and goods caused by the forcible entry of one who is, or claims to be, the lawful owner or possessor.... (Id. at 1039.) The two requirements to establish the tort are (1) peaceable possession of the premises by the plaintiff, and (2) forcible entry by the defendant. (Id. at 1039-1040.) The complaint does not state sufficient facts to determine what the parties rights were pursuant to the lease agreement. Specifically, Plaintiffs fail to reference any lease provision and fail to attach the lease agreement to the complaint. Without the lease agreement, the rights of the parties are not properly alleged in the complaint. 5th Cause of Action Violation of Civil Code Section 1940.2 Civil Code section 1940.2 generally prevents landlords from using forceful, threatening, or menacing conduct that interferes with a tenant's quiet enjoyment of the premises. Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged facts to support the 60-day notice was inappropriate or wrongful. Further, allegations that Defendants sent a 60-day notice, failed to maintain the property in a habitable condition and failed to address citations issued by the City of Long Beach were forceful, threatening or menacing conduct that interfered with Plaintiffs quiet enjoyment of the property. 6th Cause of Action Violation of Long Beach Municipal Code Section 8.101.030 Long Beach Municipal Code § 8.101.030 provides that: No owner shall: B. Acting in bad faith, (i) fail to timely perform repairs and maintenance required by a rental agreement or by Federal, State, County or local housing, health or safety laws; (ii) fail to exercise due diligence in completing such repairs once undertaken; (iii) fail to follow appropriate industry repair, containment, or remediation protocols designed to minimize exposure to noise, dust, lead, paint, mold, asbestos, or other building materials with potentially harmful health impacts; or (iv) conduct elective renovation or construction of a rental housing unit for the purpose of harassing a tenant. D. Influence or attempt to influence a tenant to vacate a rental housing unit through fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation or coercion, which shall include threatening to report a tenant to the United States Department of Homeland Security. G. Take action to terminate any tenancy, including service of any notice to quit or other eviction notice, or bring any action to recover possession of a rental housing unit, based upon facts which owner has no reasonable cause to believe to be true or upon a legal theory which is untenable under the facts known to owner. M. Commit other repeated acts or omissions of such significance as to substantially interfere with or disturb the comfort, repose, peace or quiet of any person lawfully entitled to occupancy of a rental housing unit and that cause, are likely to cause, or are intended to cause any person lawfully entitled to occupancy of a rental housing unit to vacate such rental housing unit or to surrender or waive any rights in relation to such occupancy. (Long Beach Municipal Code section 8.101.030.) Plaintiffs have pled insufficient facts to support this claim. It is unclear whether Plaintiffs alleging that the entire property is illegal and uninhabitable. There are no facts alleged to support Plaintiffs assertion that the 60-day notice to vacate was illegal. Further, Plaintiffs do not allege that they complained about conditions during their tenancy or that Defendants refused to perform repairs after Plaintiffs requests. The demurrer as to the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiffs have 20 days from the date of this ruling to amend. In light of this courts ruling, Defendants motion to strike is moot.

Ruling

DEAN E. THAYER, TRUSTEE OF THE DEAN E. THAYER TRUST DATED 5/24/2011 VS VINCENT FLAHERTY, AN INDIVIDUAL, AND AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE OF THE KHG TRUST, ET AL.

Aug 27, 2024 |6/18/2022 |23SMCV06010

Case Number: 23SMCV06010 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: I The court has received the motion to quash. An untimely opposition was filed on August 22, 2024. Plaintiff claims that the opposition should be considered because the proof of service of the motion is false; in fact, the defense claims, the papers were never served. The court has considered the opposition, but will give defendant an opportunity to submit a reply, as defendants have requested. In the reply, defendant should be sure to consider (among other things) plaintiffs position that the motion is moot because defendant moved to disqualify Judge Young pursuant to CCP section 170.6. That challenge was made on April 22, 2024, and it was granted the next day. Plaintiff might or might not be right about service of the complaint in general, but the court thinks that plaintiff has a point about the 170.6 challenge. That act constituted a voluntary general appearance. Generally speaking, if a defendant makes a general appearance, all defects of service are waived and jurisdiction is established. The court also notes that on May 23, 2024, defendants prior motion to quash was denied for issues relating to service, but without prejudice to bringing a new motion to quash and set aside the default. The court notes that plaintiff offered to stipulate to set aside the default if defendant was willing (1) to agree that service was complete as of that date and (2) answer within five days (the amount of time permitted normally in a UD case). Defendant refused to accept that proposal. In light of those proceedings and issues, the court stayed the writ of possession, but only until August 1, 2024. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the courts order, but the motion for reconsideration was denied on July 3, 2024. On July 29, 2024, defendant moved again to quash the summons, which is the motion now before the court. From this point forward, all service will be either electronically to the address that the court will obtain from the parties today or, if the parties will not stipulate to electronic service, then there will be a courtesy copy served electronically. In the instant case, plaintiff contends that he did not receive the electronic service of defendants motion. With the reply, defendant will submit the metadata from the email application that shows when the email was sent and delivered to the defense. The nice thing about email is that there is an electronic metadata stamp that will prove when it was sent and delivered. The failure to be able to produce that information will be deemed conclusive evidence that the email was never sent and that there was no service. On the other hand, if that information is produced, then it would demonstrate conclusively to the court that plaintiff is being untruthful with the court regarding service. This endless fighting about something as straightforward as proper service will end, and it will end now. For now, this hearing is continued for one week to September 3, 2024, at 9 am. Defendant will have until Thursday, August 29, 2024, at noon to file and serve the reply. The current reply will therefore be superseded by the new reply and will not be considered further by the court. Defendant should provide the court with a courtesy hard copy at the same time so that the court can be sure it will see it in time to consider the document before ruling. The court will discuss the fee waiver issues in camera.

Ruling

Aug 29, 2024 |18STCV10154

Case Number: 18STCV10154 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: 1 18STCV10154 YOUNG CHOW DAI vs FELDMAN & ROTHSTEIN, P.C., et al. 1. Application for Order to Vacate Prefilijng [sic] Order and Remove Plaintiff Judicial Council Vexatious Litigant List Form VL-120 and First Amended Application for Order to Vacate Prefilijng [sic] Order and Remove Plaintiff Judicial Council Vexatious Litigant List Form VL-120 TENTATIVE RULING: The Application for Order to Vacate Prefiling Order and Remove Plaintiff Judicial Council Vexatious Litigant List (Form VL-120) and First Amended Application for Order to Vacate Prefiling Order and Remove Plaintiff Judicial Council Vexatious Litigant List (Form VL-120) are DENIED. Counsel for Defendant Anthony Ranieri to give notice. On December 31, 2018, Young Chow Dai filed 18STCV10154 against Feldman & Rothstein P.C., Anthony Ranieri, Mauro Fiore, Jr. APC, Krystal Rosal, and Marsha Mao. On November 22, 2022, the court entered an order dismissing the action. On April 8, 2024, Commissioner Latrice A. G. Byrdsong formally declared Young Chow Dai a vexatious litigant in Los Angeles Superior Court case 18STCV10154 Dai v. Feldman & Rothstein, P.C. Under this order, Dai became subject to a Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7 prefiling requirement that requires Dai to obtain the permission of the presiding judge to file new litigation. Permission is granted only if it appears the litigation has merit and is not being filed for purposes of harassment or delay. (Code Civ. Proc. § 391.7(b).) In the Los Angeles Superior Court, the Presiding Judge has designated the Supervising Judge of the Civil Division (sitting in Dept. 1) to exercise this authority and responsibility. (See Code Civ. Proc. 391.7(e).) Discussion In the May 31, 2024 and June 5, 2024 filings, Dai seeks to vacate the prefiling order. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391.8(a), an application to vacate a prefiling order shall be made before the judge who entered the order if that judge is available; otherwise, the application shall be made before the presiding judge or his or her designee. The Supervising Judge of the Civil Division, who sits in Department 1, is the designee of the presiding judge under this statute. (Code Civ. Proc. § 391.8(a).) However, Commissioner Latrice A. G. Byrdsong remains available in Department 8 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. Accordingly, Dai must submit any application to vacate the prefiling order directly to Commissioner Byrdsong for review. (Code Civ. Proc. § 391.8(a).) Because Dais application to vacate prefiling order is not properly before Department 1, the application is DENIED without prejudice as procedurally improper. In the June 5, 2024 filing, Dai also provides a letter listing causes of action and reference enclosed exhibits that were not filed. To the extent Dais filing seeks to file new civil litigation, the request is procedurally improper. A request to file new litigation should not be filed in an existing case. In the Los Angeles Superior Court, vexatious litigants should submit their requests to file new litigation at the filing window in the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. The documents will then be forwarded to Department 1 and be addressed in due course. Moreover, Dais request is insufficient to demonstrate any proposed new litigation has merit and has not been filed for the purposes of harassment or delay. (Code Civ. Proc. § 391.7(b).) When requesting leave to file new litigation, the litigant must provide a copy of the proposed pleading to be filed as well as evidence supporting the claims asserted therein. Though Dais submission refers to a formal complaint and supporting exhibit evidence, (Mot. at 4), Dais submission is not accompanied by a proposed complaint or evidence supporting the claims asserted. 2. Plaintiffs Motion for Order (Request to File New Litigation by Vexatious Litigant Form VL-110) TENTATIVE RULING: The Motion for Order (Request for File New Litigation by Vexatious Litigant Form VL-110) filed June 5, 2024 is DENIED. Counsel for Defendant Anthony Ranieri to give notice. Background On December 31, 2018, Young Chow Dai filed 18STCV10154 against Feldman & Rothstein P.C., Anthony Ranieri, Mauro Fiore, Jr. APC, Krystal Rosal, and Marsha Mao. On November 22, 2022, the court entered an order dismissing the action. On April 8, 2024, Commissioner Latrice A. G. Byrdsong formally declared Young Chow Dai a vexatious litigant in Los Angeles Superior Court case 18STCV10154 Dai v. Feldman & Rothstein, P.C. Under this order, Dai became subject to a Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7 prefiling requirement that requires Dai to obtain the permission of the presiding judge to file new litigation. Permission is granted only if it appears the litigation has merit and is not being filed for purposes of harassment or delay. (Code Civ. Proc. § 391.7(b).) In the Los Angeles Superior Court, the Presiding Judge has designated the Supervising Judge of the Civil Division (sitting in Dept. 1) to exercise this authority and responsibility. (See Code Civ. Proc. 391.7(e).) Discussion In the June 5, 2024 filing, Dai requests to file new litigation against the Defendants. The request is procedurally improper. A request to file new litigation should not be filed in an existing case. In the Los Angeles Superior Court, vexatious litigants should submit their requests to file new litigation at the filing window in the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. The documents will then be forwarded to Department 1 and be addressed in due course. Moreover, Dais request is insufficient to demonstrate any proposed new litigation has merit and has not been filed for the purposes of harassment or delay. (Code Civ. Proc. § 391.7(b).) When requesting leave to file new litigation, the litigant must provide a copy of the proposed pleading to be filed as well as evidence supporting the claims asserted therein. Dais submission is not accompanied by a proposed complaint. Finally, Department 1 denied Dais June 5, 2024 request to file new litigation against Feldman & Rothstein P.C., Anthony Ranieri, Mauro Fiore, Jr. APC, Krystal Rosal, and Marsha Mao on August 7, 2024. Once the vexatious litigants request to file has been denied because the proposed complaint lacks merit or is designed to harass or cause delay, he or she cannot simply try over and over again. (Colombo v. Kinkle, Rodiger & Spriggs (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 407, 412.) As stated in the Courts August 7, 2024 order and argued by Defendants, Dais claims appear barred by all applicable statutes of limitations. Plaintiffs motion lacks merit and is DENIED.

Ruling

MAHRT vs Cornerstone et al

Aug 30, 2024 |SCV-270601

SCV-270601, MAHRT v. Cornerstone et al. RLI’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED. The demurrer to the first cause of action isSUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The demurrer to the second cause of action isSUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Macario’s cross-complaint is severed from case no. SCV-270601. It will proceed under thecaption David Macario DBA Macario Insurance Group v. RLI Insurance Company, Moes 1 through 50,inclusive, with a new case number to be assigned by the clerk. RLI’s counsel is directed to prepare a written order consistent with this tentative ruling andcompliant with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.I. Factual background In July 2021, Garry and Gillian Mahrt (collectively “Plaintiffs”) entered into an agreement topurchase a 158-acre ranch for $2.6 million. Defendant Cornerstone Land Co. (“Cornerstone”) was the realestate broker representing both Plaintiffs and the seller in the transaction. On August 16, 2021, Plaintiffswired the full purchase price according to transfer instructions they had received by email purporting to befrom Gabriel Foster (“Foster”), an agent with Cornerstone. Unfortunately, the email was a fraud sent bydefendant Yang Liu, one of the principals of defendant CASL International, who had hacked into computersin California and learned enough about Plaintiffs’ upcoming real estate transaction to enable him to createthe fraudulent email. As a result, Plaintiffs’ $2.6 million went into CASL’s account at defendant JPMorganChase Bank, from which it has since been withdrawn. Cross-complainant David Macario (“Macario”) was Cornerstone’s insurance broker. Cross-defendant RLI Insurance (“RLI”) was Cornerstone’s errors and omissions (“E&O”) insurer, a relationshipthat began in 2018. On August 17, 2021, Cornerstone, with Macario’s assistance, filled out an applicationto renew the E&O policy for the twelve months beginning on September 17, 2021. Question 9 on theapplication asked whether Cornerstone had “any knowledge of any incident, a circ*mstance, an event, orunresolved fee dispute that may result in a claim.” Cornerstone responded “no.” The application also statedthat if Cornerstone learned of any information that would change that answer prior to the effective date ofthe coverage, September 17, 20201, Cornerstone would notify RLI in writing of that information. Macariosent the renewal application to RLI on August 18, 2021. RLI alleges that Plaintiffs informed Cornerstone of their loss on August 20, 2021, that Cornerstonenotified Macario of the loss on August 23, that Plaintiffs’ attorney informed Cornerstone of an investigationinto the loss on December 6, and that on or about December 15, Macario instructed Macario to file a formalclaim with RLI. However, Cornerstone first apprised RLI of the loss on March 15, 2022. On April 29 andagain on May 12, RLI denied coverage on the basis that Cornerstone had failed to inform them of Plaintiffs’potential claim prior to the beginning of the coverage period on September 17, 2021.II. Procedural background The underlying lawsuit was initiated on April 14, 2022, when Plaintiffs filed a complaint againstCornerstone, Foster, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Yang Liu, and several other entities. On October 5, 2023, RLI sued Cornerstone in the Eastern District federal court, RLI Insurance v.Cornerstone (no. 2:23-cv-02265), seeking rescission of the 2021-2022 insurance policy on the grounds ofCornerstone’s misrepresentation that did not know of any pending claims. On December 19, 2023, Cornerstone cross-complained in the case at bar against Macario forprofessional negligence for failing to notify RLI of the potential claim when he became aware of it, and forequitable indemnity. On March 8, 2024, Macario filed a cross-complaint (“Cross-complaint”) against RLI for declaratoryrelief and equitable indemnity. RLI demurred to the Cross-complaint on June 4, 2024, and moved, in thealternative to sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, for severance of Macario’s cross-action fromthe underlying lawsuit. This matter comes on calendar for hearing on that motion.III. Judicial notice RLI requests judicial notice of the First Amended Complaint, Cornerstone’s cross-complaint againstMacario, Macario’s cross-complaint against RLI, and RLI’s complaint against Cornerstone in the EasternDistrict federal court. The request is granted pursuant to Evid. Code § 452(d).IV. Demurrer A. Governing law A demurrer tests whether the complaint sufficiently states a valid cause of action. (Hahn v. Merda(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) Complaints are read as a whole, in context, and are liberallyconstrued. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; see also Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, courts accept as true all material factsproperly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, conclusions of fact or law, the construction ofinstruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81Cal.App.4th 39, 43; see also South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732.)Matters which may be judicially noticed are also considered. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584,591.) If a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend should be granted where the complaint’s defect can becured by amendment. (The Swahn Group, Inc. v. Segal (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 831, 852.) A court abusesits discretion by denying leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff canstate a valid cause of action. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) However, “[l]eave toamend should be denied where the facts are not in dispute and the nature of the claim is clear, but noliability exists under substantive law.” (Lawrence v. Bank of America (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 431, 436.)The burden is on the plaintiff to show how the complaint can be amended, and how that amendment willchange the legal effect of the pleading. (Goodman, supra, at p. 349.) B. First cause of action: declaratory relief In the Cross-complaint, Macario seeks “a declaration that [RLI is] obliged to indemnify the actionherein on behalf of [Cornerstone], and [Cornerstone] has a present right to receive a defense from [RLI].”(Cross-complaint, Prayer ¶ 1.) That is, in his first cause of action, Macario seeks this Court’s declarationthat RLI is required to honor the terms of its insurance policy with Cornerstone, despite not having beentimely informed of Plaintiffs’ potential claim against Cornerstone. “Any person interested . . . under a contract [may] bring an original action . . . for a declaration ofhis rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validityarising under such instrument or contract.” (CCP § 1060.) RLI argues that Macario lacks standing toseek this relief because he is not a party to the insurance policy under which he seeks to compel RLI’sperformance, and therefore not “interested . . . under the contract.” The Court agrees that a non-party to acontract lacks standing to seek a declaration of rights under that contract. (See, e.g., Fladeboe v.American Isuzu Motors (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 55; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 331.)Macario argues in response that has standing to seek declaratory relief because he was paid a commissionfor brokering the policy and is therefore a third-party beneficiary of it, and therefore has standing to sue toenforce it. (Oppo at pp. 5-6.) A third party may bring a cause of action on a contract only when three conditions are met: thethird party would in fact benefit from the contract; “a motivating purpose of the contracting parties was toprovide a benefit to the third party”; and “permitting a third party to bring its own breach of contractaction against a contracting party is consistent with the objectives of the contract and the reasonableexpectations of the contracting parties.” (Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817, 830.) “Allthree elements must be satisfied to permit the third party action to go forward.” (Ibid.) The contract at issue here, the insurance policy issued by insurer RLI for the benefit of insuredCornerstone, appears as Exhibit B to Exhibit D of RLI’s request for judicial notice. Nothing about itsuggests that a motivating purpose of RLI and Cornerstone was to provide Macario with a commission.Macario avers that “the contract explicitly includes Macario’s commission as part of the consideration.”(Oppo at p. 6.) Macario does not point out where in the contract that explicit inclusion is to be found, andit is not obvious to the Court. Nothing in the policy mentions a commission, or payment to a broker forarranging the policy, or anything along those lines. RLI’s response to Macario’s contention that thepolicy “explicitly includes Macario’s commission as part of the consideration” is that “It does no suchthing.” (Reply at p. 2, fn. 1.) The Court sees no basis to disagree with that assessment. Moreover, even if Macario were a third-party beneficiary, his ability to enforce the policy wouldextend only to the benefits he stood to receive. A third party suing on a contract “bears the burden ofproving that the promise he seeks to enforce was actually made to him personally or to a class of which heis a member.” (Neverkovec v. Fredericks (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 337, 348-349.) If the policy contained aprovision that Macario was to be paid a commission – which, again, it does not – Macario could sue tocollect that commission if it was not paid, but he would still not be entitled to sue to enforce a promisemade by one of the contracting parties to the other one, because that would be a promise not made to himpersonally. The demurrer is sustained with respect to the first cause of action. Since Macario could notpossibly allege anything that would change the fact that he is not a party to the contract he seeks toenforce, leave to amend is denied. C. Second cause of action: equitable indemnity The principle of equitable indemnity “permit[s] the equitable sharing of loss between multipletortfeasors.” (American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578, 597; GemDevelopers v. Hallcraft Homes of San Diego, Inc. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 419, 426.) The operative wordis “tortfeasors.” Equitable indemnity is a tort concept. Cornerstone is suing Macario for professionalnegligence, so there is no question that he is alleged to be a tortfeasor. (RJN, Exh. B at p. 9.) Thequestion, then, is whether RLI is a joint tortfeasor; that is, whether Cornerstone’s damages, which consistof exposure to potential liability for Plaintiffs’ claims with no insurance coverage, are caused by RLI’stortious conduct, in addition to Macario’s alleged tortious conduct. RLI’s argument, in summary, is thatRLI cannot possibly be a joint tortfeasor because its relationship with Cornerstone is based purely oncontract, specifically on the insurance policy. Macario argues that his “involvement in the alleged wrongful acts, including misrepresentation ofthe Policy requirements, when combined with RLI’s subsequent actions denying coverage, does establisha basis for tort liability.” (Oppo at p. 10.) He does not explain how it establishes that. However, thesecond paragraph in the equitable indemnity cause of action comes close: “Therefore, CROSS-COMPLAINANT would be entitled to complete or partial equitable indemnity from CROSS-DEFENDANTS if the damages and relief claimed are covered under the any [sic] policy issued byCROSS-DEFENDANT.” It is possible for an insurer to wrongfully deny coverage and incur only liabilityfor breach of contract; if that were the situation, RLI’s (hypothetical) wrongful action would not makeRLI a joint tortfeasor, and RLI could, therefore, not be liable for equitable indemnity. However, if RLI’sdenial of coverage were not only wrongful, and not only breach of contract, but also a tort, then RLIwould arguably be a joint tortfeasor. An insurer’s denial of coverage can be a tort if it is done in bad faith. “An insurer is said to act in‘bad faith’ when it not only breaches its policy contract but also breaches its implied covenant to dealfairly and in good faith with its insured.” (Jordan v. Allstate Insurance Co. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1062,1071.) “When the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment of the claim of its insured, itis subject to liability in tort.” (Frommoethelydo v. Fire Insurance Exchange (1986) 42 Cal.3d 208, 214-215.) Thus, in theory, Macario and RLI could be joint tortfeasors if Cornerstone’s injury resulted from acombination of Macario’s professional negligence and RLI’s bad faith denial of Cornerstone’s claim.(See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1078.) Since the second cause of action incorrectly alleges that Macario would be entitled to equitableindemnity from RLI in the case of any wrongful denial of coverage, the demurrer is sustained as to thatcause of action. However, leave to amend is granted. Macario may amend the second cause of action toallege that he would be entitled to equitable indemnity if RLI is found to have denied Cornerstone’s claimin bad faith. The Court takes no position on whether Macario could prove such an allegation, but thatquestion does not arise at the demurrer stage.V. Severance of the cross-action A. RLI is not an appropriate party to this lawsuit “Generally an insurer may not be joined as a party-defendant in the underlying action against theinsured by the injured third party. The fact that an insurer has agreed to indemnify the insured for anyjudgment rendered in the action does not make the insurer a proper party. Liability insurance is not acontract for the benefit of the injured party so as to allow it to sue the insurer directly.” (Royal SurplusLines Ins. Co. v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 193, 200, citing Rutter Group, Cal. PracticeGuide: Insurance Litigation ¶ 15.11.) This principle springs from Evid. Code § 1155, which provides thatevidence that a defendant was insured at the time of an injury “is inadmissible to prove negligence orother wrongdoing.” RLI argues that this principle requires the Court to either sustain the instant demurrerwithout leave to amend or sever Macario’s cross-complaint against RLI from the case at bar. The Court agrees. The point of this rule is to avoid the trial of a personal injury action and anaction against the defendant’s insurer before the same jury, because in such a trial, “the fact of [thedefendant’s] liability insurance would . . . be disclosed to the jury which would be determining the issuesinvolved, a circ*mstance which is generally held a matter of prejudice.” (State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. v.Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 428, 432.) The holding to which the court referred became a statutoryrule when Evid. Code § 1155 took effect in 1967. “A joint trial against the insured for negligence andagainst the insurer for violating its duties under [Ins. Code § 790.03(h), which prohibits unfair claimssettlement practices] would obviously violate both the letter and spirit of [Evid. Code § 1155].” (RoyalGlobe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 23 Cal.3d 880, 891.) Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund (1988)46 Cal.3d 287 overruled Royal Globe on the issue of whether there is a private cause of action againstinsurers for unfair settlement practices, but cited the above-quoted passage from Royal Globe withapproval as authority for sustaining the insurer’s demurrer. (Id. at p. 306.) In State Farm, supra, the insurer brought a declaratory relief action against its insured, Collins,seeking a determination of whether the automobile accident in which Collins had been involved wascovered by the policy. (State Farm, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 430.) While that action was pending, severalpeople who had been involved in the accident sued Collins. (Ibid.) The trial court consolidated theactions, resulting in a case involving both a tort action against Collins and a coverage action betweenCollins and the insurer. (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court held that the consolidation was an abuse of discretionand ordered the two actions severed. (Id. at p. 433.) In Royal Globe, supra, the plaintiff sued both thefood market where she had fallen and its insurer. (Royal Globe, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 884.) Althoughthe Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff that “a third party claimant may sue an insurer” for violationsof the statute prohibiting unfair claims practices, it held that such a lawsuit must be separate from thepersonal injury action against the claimant. (Ibid.; again, the former holding was subsequently overturnedby Moradi-Shalal, supra.) The situation here differs slightly. State Farm and Royal Globe both involved a single individualwho was the defendant in the underlying tort action and also engaged in a dispute with the insurerregarding his own coverage (as a plaintiff in the case of Royal Globe and as a defendant in the case ofState Farm). Here, in contrast, the cross-defendant in the cross-action for malpractice, Macario, has suedthe insurer, RLI, over its coverage of someone else, the cross-complainant Cornerstone. That would be acrucial distinction if the cross-action were the entire lawsuit. The evil that the rule under discussion seeksto avoid is a jury learning that a defendant has insurance coverage, which Evid. Code § 1155 forbids thejury from knowing. All the jury would learn at a trial of the cross-action is that Cornerstone has insurancecoverage, which could not prejudice them in favor of granting damages to Cornerstone and againstMacario since Cornerstone would not be a party. However, the cross-action is not the entire lawsuit. The case at bar is, at its core, an action by theMahrts against Cornerstone. That is, in addition to being a cross-complainant, Cornerstone is also adefendant. Therefore, under Evid. Code § 1155, the jury is not permitted to know that Cornerstone hasinsurance that might arguably cover the plaintiffs’ damages, even under the circ*mstance that the insurerdisputes coverage. If this lawsuit proceeds as currently structured, the jury would inevitably learn that.Therefore, RLI is not an appropriate party. B. The authorities cited by Macario are not to the contrary. Macario states that his “situation is distinguishable because his claim involves professionnegligence and the need for equitable indemnity,” and that his “claims against RLI involve allegations ofprofessional negligence and the handling of the insurance claim.” (Oppo at pp. 12, 13.) (To be clear, it isCornerstone’s claim against Macario that involves allegations of professional negligence.) As authorityfor the proposition that these facts change anything, Macario cites to Otay Land Co. v. Royal IndemnityCo. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 556, characterizing it as an example of “situations where insurers have beenincluded due to their significant involvement in the underlying issues.” (Oppo at p. 13.) In Otay, theinsurer was included because it was the defendant: Otay is a simple two-party lawsuit by an insuredagainst its insurer for a declaratory judgment regarding coverage. (Id. at p. 558.) It does not address theissue presented here of an insurer and its insured both being sued by someone else in the same lawsuit. Macario also asserts that “[t]his almost precise scenario was presented in” Royal Surplus, supra,100 Cal.App.4th 193. (Oppo at p. 14.) “Almost precise” is not the same as “precise”; Royal Surpluscomes somewhat closer than Otay to being on point, but is distinguishable on its facts. There, a generalcontractor and its insurer (respectively Ocean and Royal Surplus) sued a subcontractor and its insurer(respectively Ultimate and Ranger) for indemnity after tenants of an apartment complex built by Ocean,with framing work done by Ultimate, sued Ocean over habitability issues. (Id. at pp. 196-197.) The trialcourt “sustained Ranger’s demurrer without leave to amend solely on the ground of misjoinder in that itwas improper to name both the insured and insurer in the same action.” (Id. at p. 198.) That is, the trialcourt dismissed the case on the same grounds upon which RLI urges this Court to dismiss Macario’scross-complaint. The reviewing court reversed. However, the reason for the reversal was that Ocean and Ultimatehad an explicit indemnification agreement “that required Ultimate to defend and indemnify Ocean forclaims arising out of Ultimate’s work,” and also required Ocean to be named as an additional insured onUltimate’s policy with Ranger. (Royal Surplus, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 196.) Therefore, this wasnot a so-called third-party case where an injured party sues both the party that injured him and that party’sinsurer; it was a first-party case where an injured party sued its own insurer, which is what Ranger waswith respect to Ocean under the indemnification agreement. (Id. at p. 200 [“If Ocean is an additionalinsured, then it is a first party”].) No such agreement exists here. In contrast to Royal Surplus, this is purely a third-party actionwhere a party (Macario) not in contractual privity with the insurer (RLI) is contesting the insurer’scoverage decision regarding a third party (Cornerstone). Thus, Royal Surplus does not contradict RLI’sargument that it will be severely prejudiced, in precisely the manner Evid. Code § 1155 is intended toprevent, if it is forced to litigate RLI’s claim in the same case as the Mahrts’ action against RLI’s insuredCornerstone. Finally, Macario avers that in Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d1266, “the court acknowledged that insurers could be included in actions where their involvement in theunderlying issues was significant.” (Oppo at p. 15.) Omaha involves a lawsuit by landlords againsttenants who had damaged the landlords’ rental property, as well as against Omaha, the tenants’ insurer.(Id. at p. 1269.) Omaha demurred on the basis that the tenants “were not parties to the contract ofinsurance and, therefore, had no standing to pursue a claim for declaratory relief.” (Id. at pp. 1269-1270.)(That is, on the same basis upon which RLI demurs to Macario’s first cause of action.) The trial courtoverruled the demurrer; correctly, as the reviewing court determined, because just as in Royal Surplus, theinsurance policy was “for the mutual benefit of landlord and tenant.” (Id. at p. 1269.) Therefore thelandlords were “the intended beneficiaries of the insurance policy. . . . In such instances, an action fordeclaratory relief is appropriate.” (Id. at pp. 1269, 1270.) However, this did not satisfy Omaha, which insisted that despite being in contractual privity withthe landlords, “it would suffer prejudice should the lawsuit against both itself and the [tenants] goforward.” (Omaha, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 1270.) As RLI has done here, Omaha had moved in thetrial court, as an alternative to sustaining their demurrer, to sever the declaratory relief action against themfrom the tort lawsuit against the tenants. (Ibid.) The trial court had denied that motion. After severallitigation maneuvers not relevant here, the reviewing court agreed that the actions needed to be severed inorder to avoid prejudice to Omaha, and issued a writ of mandate ordering the trial court to grant themotion to sever. (Id. at p. 1275.) As with Royal Surplus, the reviewing court’s ruling on the demurrer was based on the point thatthis was a first-party lawsuit; that is, that the plaintiffs were in contractual privity with the insurer. Again,that is not the situation here. However, as discussed next, the Omaha’s holding that “the trial courtabused its discretion when it denied Omaha’s motion to sever,” is highly relevant here. (Omaha, supra,209 Cal.App.3d at p. 1271.) C. Macario’s cross-complaint for equitable indemnity is severed from the underlying action. “The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will beconducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a causeof action asserted in a cross-complaint.” (CCP § 1048(b).) “[A] complaint and a cross-complaint are, formost purposes, treated as independent actions. [Citations.] It is within the discretion of the court to ordera severance and separate trials of such actions [citations], and the exercise of such discretion will not beinterfered with on appeal except when there has been a manifest abuse thereof.” (McLellan v. McLellan(1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 343, 353, citing McArthur v. Shaffer (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 724, 727.) RLI requests that in the event the Court does not dismiss Macario’s cross-complaint altogether, itsever the cross-action from the underlying lawsuit by the Mahrts against RLI’s insured Cornerstone.(MPA at pp. 18-19; Reply at p. 9.) Macario expresses a preference for proceeding in the current action,but provides no authority for the proposition that he is entitled to do so. (Oppo at p. 15.) His commentthat “without the inclusion of RLI in this action, there is . . . the possibility that the rights of Macario maybe essentially adjudicated in a proceeding in which he is not a participant (i.e. – the federal court action)”presumably refers to the point that his cause of action for declaratory relief in the instant case is anattempt to resolve the same question that is before the Eastern District in the RLI Insurance v. Cornerstonecase: whether the RLI/Cornerstone insurance policy is active and enforceable. But as discussed above, thatis between RLI and Cornerstone irrespective of what court it is litigated in or who else is a party to thelitigation. The Court agrees that the severance RLI requests is the best way to permit Macario to go forwardwith an action for equitable indemnity without prejudicing RLI by disclosing to the Mahrt v. Cornerstonejury that it is Cornerstone’s insurer. (Evid. Code § 1155.) Accordingly, the Court orders that Macario’scross-complaint against RLI be severed, and proceed as a separate lawsuit.VI. Conclusion The demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained without leave to amend. The demurrer to thesecond cause of action is sustained with leave to amend. Macario’s cross-complaint is severed.

Ruling

HYSON vs SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING INC.

Aug 31, 2024 |CVPS2403212

HYSON vs SELECT PORTFOLIO Motion to be Relieved as Counsel forCVPS2403212SERVICING INC. LINDA HYSONTentative Ruling: Grant. Moving counsel is ordered to lodge with the Court within 5 days a revisedproposed order including all upcoming hearing dates. Counsel is reminded that they are not relieveduntil they have filed with the Court proof of service of the signed order upon their client.

Ruling

KATRINA ALLEN, ET AL. VS AMCAL LAS BRISAS FUND, LP, ET AL.

Sep 03, 2024 |23STCV23501

Case Number: 23STCV23501 Hearing Date: September 3, 2024 Dept: 56 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT KATRINA ALLEN, etc., et al., Plaintiffs, vs. AMCAL LAS BRISAS FUND, LP, etc., et al. Defendants. CASE NO.: 23STCV23501 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE, FORM INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, SET ONE, AND FOR AN ORDER THAT THE TRUTH OF THE MATTERS SPECIFIED IN REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS, SET ONE BE DEEMED ADMITTED Date: September 3, 2024 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 MOVING PARTY: Defendants, Amcal Las Brisas Fund, LP, Amcal Multi-Housing, Inc., Las Palmas Foundation, The John Stewart Company, Percival Joseph Vaz (collectively, Defendants) RESPONDING PARTY: None The Court has considered the moving papers. No opposition has been filed. Any opposition was required to have been filed and served at least nine court days prior to the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) BACKGROUND This action arises out of a real property habitability claim for rental property. On June 20, 2024, Defendants filed motions to compel responses by Plaintiffs to certain discovery requests (collectively, the Discovery Requests), consisting of special interrogatories, set one(SIs); form interrogatories, set one (FIs); and Requests for Production, set one (RFPs), and for an order that the truth of the matters specified in Requests for Admissions, set one (RFAs) be deemed admitted (collectively, the Motions). Plaintiff also seeks an award of monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,460 as to each motion, except as to the RFAs, where the request is for $3,060. DISCUSSION Legal Standard Interrogatories Under Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) section 2030.290, subdivision (b), when a party directs interrogatories towards a party, and that party fails to serve a timely response, the party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order compelling response to the interrogatories. (CCP § 2030.290, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. (Id., § 2030.290, subd. (a).) The moving party need only show that the interrogatories were served on the opposing party, the time has expired to respond to the interrogatories and no responses have been served in order for the court to compel the opposing party to respond. (Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 902, 906.) Requests for Admissions When a party fails to serve a timely response to an RFA, the party propounding the RFA may move for an order to deem the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests admitted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. (Id., § 2033.280, subd. (a).) Requests for Production of Documents When a party fails to serve a timely response to an RFP, the party making the demand may move for an order compelling a response thereto. (CCP § 2031.300, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. (Id., § 2031.300, subd. (a).) Defendants Motions In the Motions, Defendants seek orders compelling Plaintiffs to provide responses to the Discovery Requests. Defendants served the Discovery Requests on Plaintiffs on January 18, 2024. (Declaration of Harry Safarian[1] (Safarian Decl.), ¶¶ 4-6.) Although they received two extensions of time, as of the filing of the Motions Plaintiffs had failed to provide any response to the Discovery Requests, the final deadline for which was March 27, 2024. (Id., ¶¶ 5-7.) Defendants request that all admissions be deemed admitted, all objections be waived, and Plaintiffs be compelled to answer all Discovery Requests, and produce all documents responsive to the RFPs. Defendants Motions are unopposed and they are GRANTED. The Court orders that Plaintiffs serve Code-compliant, full and verified answers to the SIs, FIs and RFPs, without objection, on Defendants within twenty days of the date of this Order. All documents responsive to the RFPs are ordered to be produced to Defendants within twenty days of the date of this Order. The Court further orders that the RFAs are deemed admitted. The Court also finds that monetary sanctions are warranted against Plaintiffs in the reasonable sum of $1,440, consisting of 2 hours total for the preparation of the Motions at $600 per hour, plus four $60 filing fees. This amount is to be paid to Defendants within twenty days of the date of this Order. Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. Dated this 3d day of September, 2024 Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court [1] A separate declaration of Harry Safarian was submitted with each motion; however, each reference to service is almost identical. Therefore, the Court refers to the Safarian Decl. in the singular. Although the motion to compel as to the SIs referenced the service of the FIs, the Court understands that the declaration is related to the SIs.

Ruling

NEELY vs DUNN, JR.

Sep 01, 2024 |CVSW2311070

DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT BY FIRSTCVSW2311070 NEELY VS DUNN, JR.AMERICAN TITLE COMPANYTentative Ruling: SUSTAN the unopposed demurrer without leave to amend. GRANTthe request for judicial notice.

Ruling

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